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Abstract	Social	 decision-making	 is	 increasingly	 studied	 with	 neurocomputational	 modelling.	Here	we	discuss	how	this	approach	allows	researchers	to	better	understand	and	predict	behavior	in	social	settings.	Using	examples	from	the	study	of	resource	distributions	and	social	learning,	we	illustrate	how	this	methodology	provides	a	flexible	way	to	quantify	social	 values	 and	beliefs,	 identify	 specific	motives	 and	 cognitive	processes	 underlying	social	choice	and	learning,	and	arbitrate	between	competing	theories	of	social	behavior.	We	also	 critically	discuss	open	questions	 and	potential	 problems	associated	with	 this	methodology.	 	 	
Introduction	How	humans	behave	in	social	settings	is	of	central	 interest	to	the	behavioral	sciences.	Classic	theories	propose	that	social	behavior	can	be	predicted	based	on	either	motives	of	the	agent	(e.g.,	[1])	or	characteristics	of	the	specific	social	situation	(e.g.,	[2]).	While	these	theories	have	been	invaluable	for	structuring	research,	many	of	them	have	been	purely	 qualitative.	 This	 has	 made	 it	 hard	 to	 predict	 the	 strength	 of	 corresponding	behavioral	effects	and	to	determine	how	factors	captured	by	different	theories	interact	in	a	given	setting.		One	way	to	overcome	these	problems	is	to	employ	neurocomputational	models	of	 affective	 and	 cognitive	 processes	 underlying	 social	 behavior.	Most	 of	 these	models	were	 developed	 to	 capture	 decision-making,	 learning,	 and	 motivation	 in	 non-social	settings,	 and	 some	 of	 them	 even	 originated	 in	 academic	 disciplines	 not	 focused	 on	behavior	 (e.g.,	 computer	 science).	 However,	 adaptations	 of	 these	 models	 allow	researchers	 to	 formally	 integrate	 both	 personal	 and	 situational	 characteristics	 into	 a	model	of	the	dynamic	control	of	social	behavior.		Here	 we	 outline	 some	 of	 the	 advantages	 (and	 potential	 shortcomings)	 of	 this	approach,	by	discussing	modelling	studies	of	 two	aspects	of	social	behavior:	Resource	allocation	and	social	 learning.	We	briefly	 introduce	the	models	employed	in	these	two	domains	and	discuss	example	studies	addressing	questions	that	would	be	hard	to	study	with	 purely	 qualitative	 approaches.	We	 close	 by	 summarizing	 potential	 shortcomings	and	open	questions	in	this	field	of	study.		
	
Modelling	resource	allocations	An	important	problem	for	families,	groups,	organizations,	and	societies	is	the	question	how	 resources	 and	 costs	 (time,	 money,	 attention,	 effort,	 etc.)	 should	 be	 distributed	among	its	members.	How	humans	determine	these	allocations	has	puzzled	researchers	for	a	 long	 time,	 leading	 to	different	proposals	about	 the	motives	 (e.g.,	 concerns	about	fairness,	efficiency,	or	self-interest	[3])	or	context	factors	(e.g.	others’	behavior	or	social	distance	 [4])	 that	may	 guide	 these	 choices.	 However,	which	motive	 or	 factor	may	 be	most	important	has	been	debated	for	decades	[5,6];	it	is	furthermore	unclear	how	these	motives	 and	 factors	 interact	 in	 given	 contexts.	 This	 question	 is	 difficult	 to	 study	with	comparisons	of	discrete	experimental	conditions,	which	usually	only	vary	one	factor	or	motive	at	a	time	 [7–9].		
To	 overcome	 this	 limitation,	 researchers	 have	 begun	 to	 employ	 computational	models	to	investigate	these	questions	in	one	overarching	framework.	The	main	class	of	models	 used	 for	 this	 purpose	 originated	 in	 behavioral	 economics	 and	 assumes	 that	humans	select	actions	to	maximize	their	projected	utility	(often	referred	to	as	“value”	in	psychology/neuroscience	 models;	 [10]).	 Using	 this	 approach	 allows	 researchers	 to	quantify	 how	 strongly	 different	 motives	 and	 context	 factors	 influence	 behavior,	 by	specifying	a	model	of	how	the	agent	should	transform	relevant	experimental	variables	(e.g.,	payoffs	 for	different	people)	 into	expected	utilities/values	of	choice	options	(e.g.,	accepting/rejecting	the	distribution).	Fitting	this	model	to	observed	choices	with	well-established	computational	methods	(reviewed	e.g.	in	[11])	makes	it	possible	to	infer	the	strength	 of	 the	 corresponding	 motive.	 	 For	 example,	 a	 popular	 type	 of	 such	 models	quantifies	 inequity	 aversion,	 the	 preference	 for	 maximizing	 fairness	 (i.e.,	 minimizing	inequity)	 in	 the	resource	distribution,	by	 including	 the	payoff	difference	between	 two	participants	as	a	component	into	the	utility	function	([12],	see	Figure	1A).		Using	these	models	has	allowed	researchers	to	make	progress	in	understanding	determinants	 of	 resource	 distribution	 behavior	 in	 several	 ways.	 First,	 the	 models’	quantitative	predictions	allow	conclusions	that	go	far	beyond	the	statement	that	people	“care	 about	 fairness”.	 For	 instance,	 studies	 using	 computational	models	 can	 not	 only	capture	inter-individual	differences	in	resource-distribution	choices	and	the	underlying	brain	structures	but	can	also	predict	how	a	given	individual	will	respond	to	changes	in	the	 cost	 of	 altruistic	 behaviors	 [13].	 Moreover,	 the	 models’	 quantitative	 predictions	make	 it	 possible	 to	 identify	 brain	 activity	 correlating	with	 each	 trial’s	model-inferred	motivational	 tendencies,	 rather	 than	 just	 observed	 choices.	 Any	 correspondence	between	predicted	motives	and	neurophysiological	processes	thus	empirically	supports	the	model	assumptions	(see	also	Figure	2).	It	would	be	hard	to	derive	such	predictions	using	 purely	 qualitative	 theories	 about	 the	 role	 of	 fairness	 concerns	 for	 resource	distribution	behavior.	Second,	 the	 fact	 that	different	motives	can	simultaneously	 impact	on	perceived	utility	allows	researchers	to	clarify	the	relationship	between	different	internal	motives	underlying	 distribution	 behaviors.	 For	 example,	 apart	 from	 concern	 for	inequity/fairness,	people	also	care	about	efficiency	of	resource	distributions	(the	total	welfare	gained	across	all	group	members	by	any	choice)	 [5].	By	 integrating	 these	 two	components	in	a	single	model,	studies	have	shown	that	concerns	about	inequity	versus	
efficiency	 reflect	 at	 least	 partially	 distinct,	 parallel	 motivational	 tendencies:	 Neural	activity	 in	 different	 brain	 structures	 was	 found	 to	 correlate	 with	 each	 distribution’s	inequity	 (insula),	 efficiency	 (putamen),	 or	 model-derived	 utility	 (caudate	 /septal	subgenual	 region)	 [14]).	 Moreover,	 pharmacological	 manipulation	 of	 the	neurotransmitter	dopamine	causally	modulated	 individuals’	 inequity	aversion	without	influencing	 concerns	 about	 others’	 payoff	 [15],	 further	 emphasizing	 the	 distinct	neurocomputational	implementation	of	both	competing	motives.		Third,	 use	 of	 neurocomputational	 models	 allows	 researchers	 to	 test	 how	different	contexts	influence	the	expression	of	individual	motives	and	the	resulting	social	behavior	[16].	For	instance,	people	tend	to	be	more	generous	toward	close	others	than	to	 distant	 strangers	 [17].	 Use	 of	 a	 social	 discounting	 model	 made	 it	 possible	 to	characterize	and	predict	how	any	given	social	distance	 influences	 the	value	placed	on	the	 other’s	 payoff	 in	 the	 utility	 function	 [18].	 The	 plausibility	 of	 this	 model	 was	underlined	by	findings	that	the	discounted	utility	curve	correlated	with	neural	activity	in	 one	 specific	 brain	 area	 (the	 temporoparietal	 junction	 TPJ;	 [19]),	 and	 that	 brain-stimulation-disruption	of	neural	 activity	 in	 this	brain	area	 systematically	 changed	 the	influence	of	social	distance	on	resource-sharing	[20].		 Fourth,	 the	 detailed	 predictions	 of	 competing	 models	 make	 it	 possible	 to	formally	 select	 the	 model	 best	 able	 to	 explain	 behavior	 and	 correlated	 physiological	processes.	 For	 instance,	 unequal	 distributions	 not	 only	 elicit	 motivational	 tendencies	modelled	 with	 utility	 functions	 but	 also	 impact	 on	 beliefs	 about	 how	 other	 people	should	act	in	these	contexts	[16,21].	A	recent	study	modelled	these	belief	changes	in	a	Bayesian	 framework	 (Figure	 1B)	 and	 could	 predict	 how	 participants	 adapted	 their	expectations	 about	 others’	 distribution	 offers	 in	 different	 contexts	 [21].	 This	 belief	model	 was	 better	 at	 accounting	 for	 observed	 behavior	 than	 utility-based	 inequity-aversion	 models,	 suggesting	 that	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 expectations	 about	others’	behavior,	rather	than	concerns	for	inequity,	can	dominate	distribution	behaviors	[22].	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 use	 of	 neurocomputational	 models	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	identify	 the	degree	 to	which	apparently	 fair	 resource	distribution	 choices	 result	 from	genuine	fairness	concerns	or	rather	from	noisy,	unsystematic	behavior.	This	was	made	possible	by	the	use	of	drift	diffusion	models	(DDMs),	a	class	of	models	that	stems	from	cognitive	 psychology	 and	 characterizes	 choices	 as	 a	 sequential	 sampling	 process	 that	
accumulates	 noisy	 evidence	 until	 a	 criterion	 is	 reached	 ([23],	 see	 Figure	 1C).	 This	model	 allowed	 researchers	 to	 identify	 for	 each	 individual	 the	 degree	 to	 which	distribution	choices	reflect	genuine	concerns	for	fairness	or	inconsistent	application	of	general	 decision	 criteria	 [24].	 That	 both	 social	 motives	 and	 general	 decision	processes/criteria	determine	social	decisions	is	also	evident	from	demonstrations	that	DDMs	 fitted	 to	 non-social	 choices	 (i.e.,	 food	 choices)	 allows	 researchers	 to	 make	accurate	out-of-sample	predictions	of	social	resource	distribution	choices	[25]	.			
Learning	Many	 social	 motives	 or	 beliefs	 are	 not	 static	 predispositions	 but	 can	 change	 with	experience	 [26].	 This	 has	motivated	 development	 of	models	 that	 dynamically	 update	utility/values	 and	 beliefs,	 thus	 allowing	 prediction	 of	 an	 individual’s	 future	 actions	based	on	her	previous	experience.	The	most	popular	class	of	these	models	characterizes	these	 changes	 as	 a	 dynamic	 reinforcement-learning	 (RL)	 process	 in	 which	 values	 or	beliefs	are	updated	by	so-called	prediction	errors	(see	Figure	1D).	These	dynamically-changing	representations	form	the	basis	for	choice	in	similar	ways	as	for	static	models	(e.g.,	 via	 DDMs,	 see	 Figure	 1C).	 The	 corresponding	 models	 provide	 a	 good	 fit	 for	different	 types	of	 learning	[27]	and	have	been	neuro-biologically	validated:	Dopamine	neurons	 and	 their	 neural	 projections	 in	 the	 ventral	 striatum	 (VS)	 encode	 prediction	errors,	 with	 increased	 firing	 rates	 for	 unexpected	 rewards	 and	 suppressed	 activity	when	expected	rewards	are	omitted	[28].	This	modelling	framework	makes	it	possible	to	 capture	 trial-by-trial	 learning	 about	 purely	 social	 contexts,	 such	 as	 others’	experiences	 or	 actions.	 Compared	 to	 simple	 comparison	 of	 two	 conditions	 (e.g.	reward/no-reward	or	social/non-social	context)	 [29],	studies	employing	these	models	can	 provide	 more	 mechanistic	 accounts	 of	 how	 experience	 gradually	 changes	 social	motivations	(Figure	2).	This	brings	several	advantages.	For	example,	use	of	these	models	can	illuminate	whether	people	learn	in	a	similar	or	 distinct	 manner	 from	 personal	 and	 social	 experience.	 Recent	 studies	 suggest	 	 the	former,	 since	 modelled	 reward	 prediction	 errors	 (RPEs)	 correlate	 with	 activity	 in	similar	 brain	 structures	 when	 individuals	 either	 experience	 rewards	 themselves	 or	merely	 observe	 others	 receiving	 these	 rewards	 [30,31].	 However,	 prediction	 errors	about	 other’s	 actions	 (rather	 than	 reward	 experiences)	 are	 reflected	 in	 activity	 of	
distinct	 brain	 areas	 [32].	 This	 suggests	 both	 overlapping	 and	 distinct	 mechanisms	involved	in	learning	from	personal	experience	or	social	observation.		Computational	modelling	also	helps	researchers	to	study	the	origins	of	conformity	[33],	which	is	traditionally	thought	to	reflect	the	motivation	to	align	one’s	behavior	with	a	group.	Computational	studies	now	suggest	that	conformity	may	rather	reflect	optimal	learning	 from	 social	 signals	 that	 resolve	 informational	 uncertainty	 [34,35].	Corresponding	models	 can	 predict	 quantitatively	 how	 choices	 are	 shaped	 by	 various	factors	(e.g.,	group	size,	strength	of	preferences,	or	private	information)	[35].	Moreover,	the	model-predicted	 informational	 conformity	 involves	 neural	 structures	 overlapping	with	 those	underlying	 learning	 from	own	experiences	[36,37].	However,	other	studies	show	 that	 individual	 risk	 preferences	 and	 the	 correlated	 neural	 activity	 can	 change	during	observation	of	other	people’s	risky	choices	[38],	suggesting	that	 	some	types	of	conformity	 can	also	 reflect	 changes	 in	motivational	 tendencies	 rather	 than	 the	aim	 to	resolve	informational	uncertainty.	Like	 their	 static	 counterparts	described	before,	 learning	models	 can	 identify	 the	parallel	 use	 and	 possible	 dominance	 of	 different	 learning	 processes.	 For	 example,	strategic	interactions	as	investigated	by	repeated	games	(e.g.,	“rock-paper-scissors”)	are	in	 principle	 optimally	 solved	 by	 randomizing	 over	 all	 three	 choices	 [39].	 However,	empirical	 choices	 often	 exhibit	 sequential	 contingencies	 that	 can	 be	 exploited	 by	 an	agent	 learning	 the	 opponent’s	 choice	 tendencies.	 This	 learning	 can	 focus	 on	 the	opponent’s	choice	history	(first-order	beliefs,	“she	tends	to	play	rock,	so	I’ll	play	paper”)	but	also	on	one’s	own	choices	(second-order	beliefs;	“I	just	played	paper,	so	she	might	think	 I	 will	 play	 it	 again,	 so	 I	 will	 play	 rock	 now”).	 These	 two	 types	 of	 beliefs	 are	updated	 in	parallel	 in	 the	 influence	 learning	model	 [40]	 (Figure	 1E).	 Confirming	 this	model,	studies	show	that	both	types	of	prediction	errors	are	encoded	simultaneously	by	different	 neural	 structures	 (first-order	 beliefs	 in	 the	 dorsal	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex	(dACC)	 [41]	 and	 second-order	 beliefs	 in	 the	 temporoparietal	 junction	 (TPJ)).	Importantly,	brain-stimulation-disruption	of	TPJ	activity	selectively	reduces	individuals’	ability	 to	 employ	 second-order	 beliefs	 during	 competitive	 interactions,	 providing	evidence	that	this	model-predicted	computation	is	indeed	necessary	to	control	strategic	behaviour	[42]	(Figure	2).	Finally,	modelling	studies	are	shedding	 light	on	 the	question	of	how	social	and	personal	 motivations	 may	 be	 integrated	 in	 the	 control	 of	 behavior.	 In	 studies	 of	
consensus	decision	making,	model-predicted	learning	of	personal	preferences	or	other’s	opinions	 takes	 place	 in	 distinct	 neural	 structures	 (ventro-medial	 prefrontal	 cortex	(vmPFC)	 versus	TPJ),	 but	 both	 types	 of	 signals	 are	 integrated	 in	 the	dorsal	ACC	 [43].	Another	 study	 showed	 that	 while	 model-predicted	 estimates	 of	 participant’s	 own		performance	in	a	social	game	were	always	encoded	in	the	ACC,	their	estimates	of	their	own	and	others’	abilities	were	merged	 in	the	dmPFC,	 taking	 into	account	whether	the	social	 context	 demanded	 competition	 or	 cooperation	 [44].	 Thus,	 computational	modelling	allowed	researchers	to	show	directly	that	identical	social	information	can	be	integrated	with	personal	information	in	different	ways	depending	on	social	context.		
Implications	and	open	questions		We	 have	 illustrated	 how	 neurocomputational	 models	 can	 benefit	 the	 study	 of	 social	behavior,	 by	discussing	 example	 studies	 of	 resource	distributions	 and	 social	 learning.	Space	 constraints	 precluded	 us	 from	 discussing	 other	 interesting	 studies	 using	 this	approach	 to	 investigate,	 e.g.,	 moral	 decision	 making	 [45–47],	 honesty	 [48],	 or	reciprocity	 [49,50].	 Research	 in	 these	 domains	 also	 clearly	 benefits	 from	 the	 use	 of	neurocomputational	models;	however,	note	that	the	specific	models	reviewed	here	may	not	 transfer	 seamlessly	 to	 all	 types	 of	 social	 behavior	 so	 that	 distinct	 computational	approaches	may	have	to	be	developed.	While	the	preceding	sections	have	emphasized	some	 advantages	 of	 using	 neurocomputational	 models	 to	 study	 social	 behavior,	 we	close	by	highlighting	potential	problems	associated	with	this	approach.		 The	use	of	different	models	to	capture	either	values,	beliefs,	or	choice	processes	carries	 the	 danger	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 model	 (rather	 than	 the	 behavior	 in	 itself)	determines	 the	 focus	of	 investigation.	 Studies	of	 repeated	 social	 interactions	 typically	characterize	 behaviors	 as	 learning/prediction	 problems,	 whereas	 studies	 of	 resource	distribution	usually	focus	on	motivations.	Since	the	models	(and	tasks)	used	to	capture	belief	 learning	 or	 preferences	 differ,	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 differences	 in	 processes	thought	to	drive	these	behaviors	may	reflect	use	of	different	computational	frameworks.	Further	 progress	 of	 the	 field	 may	 require	 more	 unified	 approaches	 to	 modelling	different	types	of	behaviors.		This	 problem	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	 studies	 of	 trust,	 which	 has	 mainly	 been	characterized	 as	 a	 learning	 problem.	 However,	 since	 trusting	 others	 makes	 oneself	vulnerable	 to	 others’	 exploitation,	 people	 have	 to	 resolve	 conflicts	 between	 potential	
profit	and	at	 least	 three	other	concerns:	 loss	aversion,	 inequity	aversion,	and	betrayal	aversion	 [51].	 Few	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	 neurocomputational	 mechanisms	underlying	these	kinds	of	aversions	in	(dis)trust	decisions,	which	could	be	studied	with	mixture	models	assigning	weights	to	these	different	concerns	[52].	In	closing,	we	stress	that	while	neurocomputational	models	can	clearly	advance	understanding	and	prediction	of	social	behavior,	they	only	provide	a	restricted	view	of	the	 underlying	 motives,	 cognitions,	 and	 processes.	 Moreover,	 some	 models	 may	 fit	behavior	 and	 brain	 activity	 largely	 because	 of	 their	 general	 flexibility	 to	 fit	 many	different	patterns	of	data.	Empirical	studies	should	therefore	strive	to	provide	evidence	that	 latent	 parameters	 of	 models	 actually	 reflect	 processes	 that	 can	 be	 selectively	changed	by	experimental	interventions	[42].		Ultimately,	the	best	models	may	be	those	that	can	structure	research	about	what	drives	social	behavior,	pretty	much	like	classic	theories,	 but	 now	 with	 a	 more	 quantitative	 and	 mechanistic	 focus.	 ”Essentially,	 all	models	are	wrong,	but	some	are	useful”	[53].		
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Figure	1.	Computational	models	of	behavior	
A.	Inequity	aversion	model	𝑈 𝑥! , 𝑥! = 𝑥! − 𝛼𝑛 − 1 max 𝑥! − 𝑥! , 0 − 𝛽𝑛 − 1 max 𝑥! − 𝑥! , 0!!!..!!!!..! 	This	 model	 determines	 the	 utility	𝑈 𝑥! , 𝑥! 	of	 a	 resource	 distribution	 characterized	 by	 the	agent’s	 payoff	𝑥! and	 the	 payoff	𝑥! to	 n	 other	 people.	 Inequity	 aversion	 is	 captured	 by	subtracting	 the	weighted	 payoff	 difference	  𝑥! − 𝑥!  	from	 the	 personal	 payoff	𝑥!  [12].	 The	strength	 of	 this	 concern	 is	 captured	 by	 the	 weighting	 parameters	𝛼	and	𝛽,	 as	 expressed	 in	disadvantageous	 𝑥! > 𝑥!  and	advantageous	 𝑥! < 𝑥! 	conditions,	respectively.		
B.	Bayesian	observer	model	This	 model	 allows	 researchers	 to	 examine	 how	 people	 form	 beliefs	 about	 other	 people’s	distribution	offers.	The	prior	belief	about	the	distribution	of	offers	is	a	Gaussian	with	mean	µ	and	variance	σ!:	 𝑝 𝑢 = 𝑝 𝑢 𝜇,𝜎! 𝑝 𝜇,𝜎! 	When	the	participant	observes	an	offer	𝑥!	at	trial	𝑡,	she	will	update	this	belief:		𝑝 𝑢!|𝑥! = 𝑝 𝑥!|𝑢! 𝑝 𝑢!!!𝑝 𝑥! 	This	 updated	 belief	 becomes	 the	 new	 prior.	With	 this	model,	 researchers	 can,	 for	 example,	derive	 the	expected	offer	 (norm)	at	 trial	t:	𝐸[𝑢!] = 𝑢! ,	 or	 the	deviation	of	 a	 given	offer	 from	expectations:	𝛿! = 𝑥! − 𝐸[𝑢!!!] = 𝑥! − 𝑢!!!	[21].	
	
C.	Drift	diffusion	model	 𝑑𝑦 𝑡 = 𝑣(𝛥𝑢) ∙ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎 ∙ 𝑑𝑊	Drift	diffusion	models	 formalize	 the	decision	process	 itself	 as	a	 sequential	 sampling	process	that	 accumulates	 noisy	 evidence	 for	 one	 choice	 option	 over	 the	 other	 	 (e.g.,	 difference	 in	utilities	 between	 two	 options)	 until	 a	 criterion	 is	 reached	 [23].  𝑦 𝑡 	is	 the	 amount	 of	accumulated	evidence	at	 time	𝑡,	𝛥𝑢	is	 the	difference	 in	utilities	between	two	options, 𝑣	is	 the	parameter	 quantifying	 the	 efficiency	 of	 evidence	 accumulation	 (drift	 rate),	 and	𝜎 	is	 the	Gaussian	 noise	 parameter	 of	 the	 Wiener	 process	𝑑𝑊 .	 Additionally,	 DDMs	 also	 include	parameters	capturing	bias	in	the	choice	process,	decision	threshold,	and	non-decision	time.		
D.	Reinforcement	learning	(RL)	model	The	 simplest	 and	 most	 popular	 RL	 model	 is	 the	 Rescorla-Wagner	 rule	 [54].	 This	 model	assumes	 that,	 at	 time	 (or	 trial)	 t,	 the	 brain	 computes	 values	 for	 available	 actions	 (𝑄!)	 and	updates	these	values	as	follows:	 𝑄!!! = 𝑄! + 𝛼 ∙ 𝛿! ,	where	𝛼	is	 the	 learning	 rate,	 and	𝛿!	is	 the	 prediction	 error,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	actual	reward	received	at	time	t	(rt)	and	the	expected	reward,	which	is	the	stored	action	value:	𝛿! = 𝑟! − 𝑄! .	
	
E.	Influence	learning	model	This	model	 updates	 the	 individual’s	 future	 belief	𝑝!!!	about	what	 the	 opponent	will	 choose	using	the	past	belief	𝑝!	and	two	types	of	weighted	prediction	errors:	𝑝!!!∗ = 𝑝!∗ + 𝜂 𝑃! − 𝑝!∗ + 𝜅 𝑄! − 𝑞!∗∗ ,	𝜂 𝑃! − 𝑝!∗ 	represents	fictitious	play,	i.e.,	learning	of	the	opponent’s	choice	history	(“first-order	
beliefs”),	 with	 𝜂 	being	 a	 learning	 parameter	 scaling	 the	 prediction	 error.	 𝜅 𝑄! − 𝑞!∗∗ 	represents	 learning	how	the	player’s	own	actions	 influence	 the	opponent’s	choices	(“second-order	beliefs”;	again,	𝜅 reflects	a	separate	learning	rate)[40].	This	model	allows	separation	and	quantification	of	two	competing	motivations	that	can	influence	strategic	choice.	
	
	
Figure	 2.	 An	 illustration	 of	 how	 neurocomputational	 modelling	 allows	 identification	and	separation	of	different	cognitive	processes	underlying	learning	in	a	strategic	game.	The	 subject	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 an	 employee	 choosing	 between	 “working”	 (Y)	 and	“shirking”	(N),	while	the	opponent	outside	of	the	scanner	is	choosing	to	“inspect”	(Y)	or	“not	 inspect”	 (N).	 Subject	 and	 opponent	 have	 opposing	 aims,	 since	 the	 subject	 wins	when	both	players’	choices	match	(Y/Y	or	N/N)	but	 the	opponent	wins	when	they	do	not	match	 (Y/N	or	N/Y).	For	 the	choices	observed	on	each	 trial	 (given	 in	 the	 top	 two	lines	of	the	figure),	behavior	and	brain	activity	can	be	regressed	on	simply	the	observed	outcomes	 (winning	 or	 losing,	 green	 line	 depicts	 the	 corresponding	 regressor).	 This	would	 allow	only	 limited	 inference	 on	 cognitive	 processes	 contributing	 to	 the	 choice.	However,	 fitting	 the	 computational	 learning	 model	 described	 in	 Figure	 1E	 allows	prediction	of	how	participants	should	use	the	outcomes	to	update	their	predictions	of	what	the	opponents	will	play	based	on	two	types	of	beliefs:	First-order	beliefs	about	the	opponent’s	choice	tendencies	(“fictitious	play”)	or	second-order	beliefs	about	how	their	choices	 influence	 the	 opponent	 (“influence	 learning”).	 Evidence	 for	 these	 types	 of	learning	is	given	by	the	fact	that	both	predicted	updates	correlate	with	activity	in	two	different	 regions	 in	 the	 brain	 (dorsal	 ACC	 and	 TPJ)	 [42],	 and	 that	 brain-stimulation-disruption	 of	 TPJ	 activity	 reduces	 the	 participants’	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 influence	learning		[42]	.	
Fictitious	play
update
Influence	learning
update
Choice
Opponent’s	
choice
Winning	and
losing
